主题             Why CEO Pay Ratios Matter: Employee-Driven Inequity and the Cost of Equity首席执行官薪酬差距为何重要：员工导向的不平等与权益资本成本

活动时间     2026年6月23日（周二）下午14：00-17：00

活动地址     文济楼404

主讲人        万慧善教授，北爱荷华大学

主持人        黄琼宇教授，性爱网-免费成人性爱影片

主办单位    性爱网-免费成人性爱影片

万慧善教授是美国北爱荷华大学会計教授，商学院MAcc中心主任，美国注册會计师。主要讲授中级会计，高级会计，财务会计理论与分析。研究兴趣包括：盈余管理，公司治理，债券市场，和企业避税。

讲座简介

This study examines how CEO pay ratio disclosures affect firms’ cost of equity and identifies the mechanism through which internal pay inequality is priced in capital markets. Using an expectations-based framework, we distinguish whether high CEO pay ratios stem from elevated CEO compensation or relatively low employee compensation. We document a positive association between CEO pay ratios and the cost of equity, concentrated among firms where high pay ratios reflect unexpectedly low employee compensation. Using Glassdoor employee ratings and path analysis, we document that un-expected high CEO pay ratios reduce employees’ evaluations of leadership, which are associated with higher costs of equity. The indirect effect is stronger in states where income inequality is more salient. Overall, our results indicate that employee perceptions represent a meaningful transmission mechanism linking CEO pay ratios to financing costs. The findings suggest that CEO pay ratio disclosures convey incremental information about internal pay fairness and human capital risk that capital markets partially incorporate into required returns.

本研究考察了CEO薪酬比率披露如何影响企业的权益资本成本，并阐明了内部薪酬不平等在资本市场中定价的机制。基于预期框架，我们区分了高CEO薪酬比率是源于高昂的CEO薪酬，还是相对较低的员工薪酬。研究表明，CEO薪酬比率与权益资本成本呈正相关，且主要集中在那些高薪酬比率反映了“意外低员工薪酬”的企业。通过利用Glassdoor员工评分和路径分析，我们发现意外偏高的CEO薪酬比率会降低员工对领导层的评价，而这种评价与更高的权益资本成本相关。在收入不平等问题更为突出的地区，这种间接影响更为强烈。总体而言，我们的研究结果表明，员工的看法构成了将CEO薪酬比率与融资成本联系起来的重要传导机制。这些发现表明，CEO薪酬比率的披露传达了有关内部薪酬公平性和人力资本风险的增量信息，资本市场已将其部分纳入必要回报率的考量之中。